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RECENT CASE NOTES
ALIEN ENEMIEs-NATURALIzATIN--"API'ucATIoN."--U. S. Rev. St sec.
2171 (Comp. St. 19i6, sec. 4362), first enacted in i8o2 (Act April 14, 1802,
ch. 28, 2 Stat 153) declares that no alien who is a native citizen or subject
or a denizen of any country with which the United States is at war "at
the time of his application" shall then be admitted to citizenship in the
United States. By the Act of June 29, i9o6, c. 3592, 34 Stat 596 (Comp. St.
I916, sec. 4362) the naturalization law was changed and aliens were for the
first time required to file a petition for citizenship, and ninety days' notice
of such petition had to be given before final hearing thereon in open court.
The applicant was a German citizen. War was declared between the filing
of his petition and the date set for final hearing. Held, that the final
appearance of the applicant in open court and not the filing of the petition
should be regarded as the "application" referred to in the act of 1802, and
the applicant must be denied admission. In re Naturalization of Subjects
of Germany (1917, E. D. Wis.) 242 Fed. 97i.
See, in accord, Ex parte Borchardt (1917, E. D. S. C.) 242 Fed. ioo6;
In re Haas (1917, N. D. Tex.) 242 Fed. 739; In re Jonasson (i917, D. C.
Md.) 24i Fed. 723. But see, contra, United States v. Meyer (i917, C. C. A.
2d) 24I Fed. 3o5, Hough, J., dissenting; In re Nannanga (1917, S. D. Ga.)
242 Fed. 737; In re Kreuter (1917, S. D. Cal.) 241 Fed. 985. The principal
case would seem to represent the better view. The apparent purpose of
the statute being to protect the United States against the admission of
persons whose loyalty might be doubtful, it should be strictly construed in
favor of the Government.
ALIEN ENEmS-RIGHT To SuE.-The resident manager (erroneously
assumed by the court to be a German) of a domestic corporation, prac-
tically all of whose stock was owned by a German corporation, brought
suit on behalf of himself and with power of attorney to represent the
German majority stockholders for an injunction against the two American
directors, charging them with deliberately seeking to wreck the corpora-
tion. A motion was made to stay the prosecution of the suit on ground
that plaintiffs were alien enemies. Held, that the suit might be maintained,
since the tolerance implied in the Presidenes proclamation assuring German
residents that they would be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their
occupations, and his statement that the sins of the German Government
"ought not to be visited on" the German people, were a declaration of
public policy, by which policy the courts were bound. Posselt v. D'Espard
(I917, N. J. Ch.) ioo AtI. 893. See COMMENTS, p. io4.
AL=N ENEmms-RIGHT TO Sut--DomEsric COPORATioN WITH GERMAN
STOCKHOLDEs.-The plaintiff was a New Jersey corporation. Of its capital
stock of 50 shares, 45 were owned by a German corporation, 2 by a Ger-
man subject, 2 by American citizens, and I by an Austrian subject who
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resided in the United States and acted as manager of the plaintiff corpo-
ration. The four individual stockholders constituted the board of
directors. A motion was made to stay the further prosecution of the suit
on the ground that the plaintiff was an alien enemy. Held, that the suit
might be maintained because the corporation should be regarded as an
entity separate and apart from its stockholders and because the control
of the company was vested in a board of directors, of whom the majority
(including the manager) were residents of the United States. Fritz
Schultz, Jr., Co., v. Raimes & Co. (1917, N. Y. Sup. Ct), i66 N. Y. Supp.
567. See CoMmErs, p. io8.
BANKRUPTCY-REV NG BARBD DEBT As FRAUDULENT "INcuMBRANc."--
The day before a petition in bankruptcy was filed against him, a debtor
made a payment upon a statute-barred debt, intending to revive it The
debtor was aware of his insolvent condition, the creditor was not The
creditor, offering to restore the payment, filed his claim on the revived
debt Held, that the claim should be disallowed, its revival being an
"incumbrance' of the bankrupt's property and void under section 67e of
the Bankruptcy Act In re Salmon (i9i6, S. D. N. Y.) 239 Fed. 413.
See COm m-TS, p. 126.
BILLS AND NoTEs-HoLDER IN Dun CouRsE-CoPoRATioN's CHECK UsED
iN INTEREST op FIscAL OFnE -W. was treasurer of the plaintiff corpora-
tion and also of the B. company. The defendant bank held for collection
a note of the B. company which W. had indorsed. To pay this note W.
wrongfully drew the plaintiff company's check, signed by himself as
treasurer, to the order of the defendant This check, after being certified,
was received by the defendant from a representative of the B. company
in payment of the note on its date of maturity. Held, that there was
nothing in the transaction to put the defendant bank on notice that W.
was misappropriating the funds of the plaintiff to pay his own debt
Colonial Fur Ranching Co. v. First Nat. Bank (i9x7, Mass.) i16 N. E.
731.
The fact that the corporate obligation is drawn by the official payable
to himself and used to pay his own debt is not of itself constructive notice
of lack of authority. Fillebrown v. Hayward (19o6) i9o Mass. 472, 77
N. E. 45; contra, Rochester Turnpike Road Co. v. Paviour (igoo) 164
N. Y. 281, 58 N. . 114. But even in Massachusetts, where the instru-
ment is made payable to a creditor of the officer, the creditor takes at
his peril. Johnson v. Longley Co. (IgIo) 207 Mass. 52, 56, 92 N. E.
1o35. The question before the court in the principal case was
whether or not it would carry this doctrine farther and apply it
where the officer was not absolutely liable to the payee, as a debtor, but
only contingently as an indorser. The liability of a bankrupt indorser
has been called a provable "debt" In re Philip Semmer Glass Co. (i9o5
C. C. A., 2d) 135 Fed. 77. But the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act was
to relieve insolvents from their pecuniary liabilities. Moch v. Market
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St. Nat. Bank (i9ol, C. C. A., 3d) 1o7 Fed. 897, 898. So that while the
Bankruptcy Act seems to treat an indorser as an actual debtor, it does not
do so in reality, for "debt" as used there may mean only "claim" or
"liability." Moch v. Market St. Nat. Bank, supra. In the instant case, the
court said that the debt was primarily that of the B. company, the officer
being only contingently liable. Refusal to extend the doctrine of notice to
such a case is believed to be sound.
G. L. IK
CAmuEas-CARMAcK AimqENDmE-BnL oF LADING ISSUED BY CON-
NECTING CAmu -.-The plaintiff as shipper of live stock received a bill of
'lading from the initial carrier. The connecting carrier issued a second bill
changing the liability by requiring 30 days' notice of claim in order to
hold the carrier liable. Held, that the second bill was invalid for lack of
consideration and because the enforcement of its terms would defeat the
policy of the Carmack Amendment Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Ward
(1917) 37 Sup. Ct. 617.
This holding is a natural corollary to the rule already established under
the Carmack Amendment that the bill of lading issued by the initial carrier
applies to the entire transportation and fixes the rights and duties of all
participating carriers. See Georgia, Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling
Co. (1915) 241 U. S. i9o, 196, 36 Sup. Ct. 541, 544, and cases there cited.
CARRIERS-CARMACE: AmENDMENT--PRESUMPTION AGAINST TERmINAL
CAmEum-In an action against the terminal carrier to recover damages
for injury to goods, the plaintiff introduced evidence to show that the
goods were delivered in good condition to the initial carrier and were
received from the defendant in a damaged condition. The defendant con-
tended that since the passage of the Carmack Amendment this did not make
a prima facie case. Held, that the common law presumption against the
terminal carrier was not superseded by the Carmack Amendment, which
did not establish any presumption, but merely gave an optional remedy
against the first carrier for the entire transportation. Salinger, J.,
dissenting. Erisman v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. (1917, Ia.) 163 N. W. 627.
The point decided is not new, even in Iowa (see cases cited on p. 631 of
the opinion), but the case is worthy of note for its detailed reExamination
of the whole subject, with full discussion of both sides of the question
and an apparently exhaustive collection of authorities.
CARRIERS - NON-DELVERY - RESTRAINT oF PwNcEs.-The defendants
agreed with the plaintiffs to provide a steamer to proceed to Marionpol,
and there load a cargo and carry it to Japan. On September I, the defen-
dants refused to name a steamer on the untrue assertion that the British
government had prohibited steamers going to the Black Sea to load. The
Turkish government closed the Dardanelles on September 26. The
defendants pleaded "restraint of princes" as a justification of their breach
of the charter-party. The ship would not have had time to reach the
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Dardanelles before the closing. Held, that a reasonable apprehension of
the impending dosing of the Dardanelles, though justified by the event,
did not constitute a restraint of princes, and the defendant was not
excused. Watts & Co. Ltd. v. Mitsui & Co. Ltd. [1917] A. C. 227.
The question decided was similar to that involved in the case of the
Kronprinzessin Cecilie, discussed in (1917) 26 YAm.n LAw JoumNAL, 247,
791, in which the decision of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
that the owners of the ship were not excused by reasonable apprehension
of war, was reversed by the Supreme Court. The opinion in the Supreme
Court cites as authority a dictum in the English case in the Court of
Appeal, which appears to be contradicted by the above decision of the
House of Lords.
Co ucT op LAws-Ex PArE DEcREn OF JUDIcIAL SEPARATIoN-FoREIGN
REcoGNrrIoN.-A husband and wife from the time of their marriage in
New York never lived together. The wife, "domiciled" in New York,
procured an ex parte divorce from bed and board, on grounds of cruelty.
When her husband, domiciled throughout in Connecticut, began suit there
for divorce a vinculo for desertion, she introduced the New York decree
to justify her living apart. Held, that such a decree, as opposed to full
divorce, did not affect the marriage status, was personal in its nature, and
was not in any way effective in another state unless entered by a court
having jurisdiction over the defendant Pettis v. Pettis (I917) 9i Conn.
6o8, IOI Atl. 13. See Cobmivs, p. 117.
CoNFLICT OF LAWS-FOREIGN MA=AGF--EmAIAGE PRomBrrE FOR
LImID TiimE AFTER DivoRcuTwo residents of Illinois were married in
Indiana within a year after the woman had obtained a divorce in Illinois.
By statute in Illinois, and by the terms of the divorce decree, such a
marriage was prohibited, and would not have been recognized in Illinois.
Subsequently the parties removed to Wisconsin where a similar statute
was in force. Upon the death of the "husband," the woman filed a claim
under the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act. Held, that the mar-
riage was void and that the claimant was not entitled to compensation as
the wife of the deceased. Hall v. Industrial Commission (1917, Wis.)
162 N. W. 312.
It is the general American rule, based on the policy of giving legal
sanction wherever possible to what may be called a marriage in fact, that
the lex loci celebrationis determines the validity of a marriage. Wharton,
Conflict of Laws (3d ed.) see. 127 et seq. Accordingly, statutes prohibit-
ing marriage for a specified period after divorce have frequently been
construed as applying only to marriages in the same state, and a marriage
elsewhere may be held valid even in the prohibiting state. Estate of Wood
(902) I37 Cal. 129, 69 Pac. goo; Dudley v. Dudley (9HI) 151 Ia. 142,
130 N. W. 785; contra, Lanham v. Lanham (i9o8) 136 Wis. 360, 117 N. W.
787; Wilson v. Cook (I912) 256 Ill. 46o, Ioo N. E. 2. Outside the
prohibiting state, it is not believed that such a marriage, if valid where
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celebrated, has ever before been denied recognition, and this is conceded
in the principal case. The decision seems to proceed in part on the theory
originally follo.wed by the civil law, which finds some support in the
English cases, that capacity to marry is a matter of personal status, to be
determined by the law of the domicile. Cf. Sottomayor v. De Barros
(1877) 3 P. D. i; Brook v. Brook (i86i) 9 H. L. Cas. 192. But the
question is confused by the emphasis placed on the public policy of the
forum, as evidenced by the Wisconsin statutes, and its similarity to the
policy of Illinois. If the law of the domicile is the proper criterion, its
application can hardly be conditioned on such similarity. And since it
was not the public policy of Wisconsin, but the similar policy of Illinois,
which the court professedly enforced, the decision cannot be explained
on the analogy, which would be strained at best, of cases holding that the
distinctive public policy of the forum may deny recognition to certain
classes of foreign marriages. State v. Bell (1872, Tenn.) 7 Baxt. 9
(miscegenation); United States v. Rodgers (igoi, D. C. E. D. Pa.) iog
Fed. 886 (consanguinity). The decision might possibly be supported by
regarding the situation as similar to that existing before a decree nisi
has become absolute, and considering the divorce incomplete until the year
has expired. This ground also is suggested in the opinion, but no other
decided case has been found to support it. See, however, dissenting
opinion in Estate of Wood, supra; and cf. McLennan v. McLennan (I897)
3 Oreg. 480, 5o Pac. 8o2.
L. F.
CONFLICT OF LAws-WoRExEN's COmPENSATION ACT-FoREIGN CONTRACT
OF EMPLOYMENT-The plaintiff, employed under a contract made in
Massathusetts, was injured in Connecticut while working within the scope
of his employment. Suit was brought in Connecticut under the Con-
necticut Workmen's Compensation Act. Held, that the plaintiff might
recover. Donthwright v. Champlin (917) 91 Conn. 524, ioo At. 97. See
CoMMENTs, p. 113.
CoNsTITUTIONA. LAv-ADmIRALTY-STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACT NOT APPLICABLE TO INJURIES WITHIN ADmIRALTY JURISDICTIoN.-An
employee of a comPany operating a coastwise steamship line was accident-
ally killed while 'engaged in the work of unloading a cargo at a pier in
New York. In proceedings under the New York Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, his widow and children received an award which was approved
by the New York Court of Appeals. The case was taken by writ of error
to the United State Supreme Court. Held, that the state compensation act,
as applied to matters within admiralty jurisdiction, was in conflict with the
grant of exclusive admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts by the Con-
stitution, and was to that extent invalid, and the award must be set aside.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (917) 37 Sup. Ct. 524. See COMMENTS,
next month.
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw-CoNsTiTUTIONAL CoETIoNS--LEGISLTiua'S
PowER To CAL.-The plaintiff brought suit for himself and all other
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tax-payers of the state, to enjoin the enforcement of an act of the legisla-
ture-providing for the calling of a constitutional convention without first
submitting the question to the people. The state constitution contained
no provision for the calling of such conventions. On a submission of the
question three years before, the electorate had declined to authorize a
convention. Held, that the act in question was beyond the powers of the
legislature and the injunction should issue Lairy, J., dissenting. Bennett
v. Jackson (1x17, Ind.) 116 N. E. 921.
In the absence of judicial authority the weight of opinion among text-
writers seems to be against the instant case. Jameson, Const. Conv. (6th
ed.) 211; Dodd, The Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions, 44;
6 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 896; Cooley, Const. Lint. (6th ed.) 42. But
there are strong arguments in favor of the decision. Legislative power
may be divided into two classes, ordinary and fundamental. Jameson,
Const. Cony. 84-86. The grant of legislative authority to the General
Assembly confers only the power to pass ordinary legislation. McCullough
v. Brown (1893) 41 S. C. 22o, 248, ig S. E. 458, 473. The power to pass
fundamental legislation is still retained by the people. In drawing the
line between the two, extra-legal factors, such as custom, political ten-
dency, expediency, public policy, must necessarily have influence. It is
an almost universal custom in the states, in the absence of constitutional
provision, first to submit the question of calling a convention to the people.
6 R. C. L. 27. In the few contrary instances cited by the dissenting judge
the power of the legislature had not been challenged. Granting that
where the people have no machinery to institute legislation there must be
an implied power in the legislature to take the first step, this may well
be limited to what is absolutely necessary to enable the people to exercise
their reserved powers. Nor can it be said to be immaterial whether the
people act before or after the convention, in view of the large expenditure
of public money which the calling and holding of such conventions neces-
sarily involve. In view of these considerations, the decision in the instant
case may well be accepted as sound.
C. S. B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF Szimzcz DRAFT ACT-
The defendants were indicted for conspiring to procure persons to vi6late
certain penal provisions of the "selective draft act" of May i8, 1917.
On a motion to quash the indictment they attacked the constitutionality
of the act, objecting, among other grounds indicated below, that it deprived
the courts of the United States of the power to pass on the exemptions
provided by the act, and that it called out the militia for a purpose
not authorized by the Constitution. Held, in sustaining the indict-
ment, that the act was within the power "to raise and support armies"
conferred.by Art. I, sec. 8, subdivision 12 of the Constitution; that it did
not call out the militia as such, but, in the exercise of the general power
to draft all citizens, drafted into the national army the members of the
militia organizations; that compulsory military service is not "involuntary
servitude" within the prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment; that the
exemption boards, if courts at all, were military courts established under
the power given by Art. I, sec. 8 of the Constitution "to make rules for
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the government and regulation of the land and naval forces" and their
decisions, like those of other military tribunals, need not be reviewable by
the civil courts; and that the act involved no unconstitutional delegation
of legislative or judicial powers. United States v. Sugar (1917, F. D.
Mich.) 243 Fed. 423.
The constitutionality of the same act was upheld against certain of the
same objections in an eloquent opinion by Judge Speer in Story v. Perkins
(ziq7, S. D. Ga.) 243 Fed. 997, and the claim of "involuntary servitude"
was disposed of in a single sentence in Claudius v. Davie (1917, Cal.)
165 Pac. 689. In the Story case the further objection was made and over-
ruled that Congress had no power to compel service outside the United
States. The decisions are interesting as current history, but the questions
raised presented little novelty and less difficulty. Several cases upholding
the draft act of Civil War times are cited in the principal case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS or LAw-DmsioN OF STATE
CouRT.-In a suit to collect special assessments the defendant landowner
offered evidence that he was not benefited. The evidence yas refused.
Consequently an intervenor (the owner of bonds payable from the tax)
offered no evidence to rebut that which had been rejected. When judg-
ment favorable to the intervenor was reversed by the state Supreme Court
without remanding, the intervenor claimed a violation of his constitutional
rights. Held, that since the decision of the state court on appeal amounted
to excluding the intervenor's evidence at trial, it denied him due process
of law. Saunders v. Shaw (917) 37 Sup. Ct 638.
Two insurance companies being sued in Tennessee but not served, filed
pleas in abatement in the Tennessee court, which, on the strength of these
pleas, assumed jurisdiction over the parties and rendered judgment for the
plaintiff. Suit being brought in Illinois on this judgment, the Illinois court
refused to question the jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts. Held, that
such a refusal did not amount to a denial of due process of law to the
insurance companies. Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry (917) 37 Sup. Ct.
492. See COMMENTS, p. 121.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS-EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES FORBIDDEN
TO TAKE FEES FROM WoRERs.-The plaintiffs, proprietors of private
employment agencies, sought to enjoin the enforcement of the Washing-
ton Employment Agency Law which forbade the collection of fees from
workers for furnishing them with employment. Held, that the statute
was an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment Brandeis, McKenna,
Holmes, and Clarke, JJ., dissenting. Adams v. Tanner (1917) 37 Sup.
Ct 662.
Under the police power the states have the right to regulate any business,
vocation, or occupation. Schmidinger v. City of Chicago (1913) 226 U. S.
578, 33 Sup. Ct 182. They may go even farther and prohibit absolutely
the maintenance of any business, where the public welfare requires its
discontinuance. Cosmopolitan Club v. Virginia (19o8) 2o8 U. S. 378, 28
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Sup. Ct. 394. Private employment agencies are regulated by statute in at
least thirteen states and such statutes have been upheld, the purpose of
preventing fraud being a sufficient justification for the exercise of the
police power. Brazee v. Michigan (i916) 241 U. S. 340, 36 Sup. Ct 561.
The Washington statute purports to regulate private employment agencies
but it was alleged that its actual operation would practically prohibit them,
as such agencies could scarcely exist without the privilege of collecting fees
from those seeking employment. Yet, have such agencies any constitu-
tional right to exist? There seems to have been ample evidence of such
evils as would render them fit subjects for the police power; and it was
primarily for the state legislature to determine how drastic a remedy was
necessary. The statute is not arbitrary according to the test laid down in
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Co. (igii) 22o U. S. 61, 31 Sup. Ct. 337.
It is submitted that the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, remark-
able for its modern method of approach and comprehensive marshalling
of social data, presents the better view and is more in line with the recent
progressive policy of the Supreme Court, which has affirmed with but
rare exception state statutes intended to advance "social justice."
S. J. T.
CONSTITuTIONAL LAw-Dum PRocEss OF LAw-ORDER OF RA roAD Com-
missioN.-The plaintiff railroad having cut down its local passenger
service as a war economy measure, was, after a hearing by the State Rail-
road Commission, ordered to operate additional trains. It appeared that
the traffic would not pay a reasonable profit over cost of operation. Held,
that such a regulation was a violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Mississippi R. R.
Com. v. Mobile & Ohio R. R. (1917) 37 Sup. Ct 6o2. See Commalrs,
p. 21.
CoNsTITuTiONAL LAW-INTERSTATE ComM-ERcE - FESERAL EmPLOYERs'
Li.BniLy AcT EXcLUDING STATE LErIsLATiN.-The plaintiff, while in the
employ of a railroad company engaged in interstate commerce, suffered
personal injuries without negligence on the part of the company. The
Federal Employers' Liability Act (Comp. Stat 1916, §§8657-8665) regulated
the liability of such railroad companies to their employees in cases involv-
ing negligence, but did not impose any liability in the absence of negligence.
The New York Workmen's Compensation Act (N. Y. Laws 1913, ch. 816;
Laws x914, ch. 4i and 316) provided that employees might recover for
injuries received in the course of their employment, without regard to the
negligence of the employer. Held, that the plaintiff could not have the
benefit of the New York act since the Federal act was exclusive. Brandeis
and Clarke, JJ., dissenting. New York Cent. R. R. Co. v. Winfield (917)
37 Sup. Ct. 546.
This decision reverses the holding of the New York Court of Appeals
in Winfield v. New York Cent. R. Co. (1915) 216 N. Y. 284, iio N. E. 614,
which was adversely criticised in (1916) 25 YAME LAW JOURNAL, 497. For
a discussion of a recent Supreme Court decision still further narrowing
the field of state legislation of this character, see CoMmENs, next month.
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CONSTuTIONAL LAw-WoHMEN'S COmPENSATION ACr-CMPULSORY
ComPExNSATION.-The plaintiff sued in a common law action to recover for
injuries received in the course of employment through the negligence of
the defendant company. The Maryland Employer's Liability Act (Laws
1914, ch. 8oo) required employers to provide compensation and limited the
amount that might be recovered, giving the employer an option to secure
the compensation through state insurance, insurance with an authorized
insurance corporation, or by a deposit of securities with the state com-
mission. If he failed to secure it in any of these ways, the employee could
proceed either for compensation under the act or by common law action in
which the employer was denied the benefit of certain common law defences.
The defendant pleaded that it had complied with the provisions of the act
and was not liable to a common law action. The plaintiff demurred, on
the ground that the act contravened the Fourteenth Amendment. Held,
that the act was constitutional. Solvuca v. Reilly & Ryan Co. (1917,
Md.) ioi Atl. 710.
The act here in question was similar to the New York act upheld in
New York Cent. R. Co. v. White (1917) 37 Sup. Ct. 247. For a discussion
of the constitutionality of the Washington act, which is even more rigid
in character, in that it requires employers of certain hazardous occupations
to malke enforced contributions and denies even the alternative of self-
insurance, see (917) 26 YALE LAW JomuRAi , 618.
CONTRACTs-AsSIGNABILITY-AsSIGNMENT BY PURCHASER ON CREDI.-
The defendant undertook to transport sand and gravel for the plaintiff's
assignor, and was to be paid each month for the previous month's deliv-
eries. On being notified of the assignment to the plaintiff, the defendant
refused to perform on the ground that the contract was non-assignable.
Held, that the contract was assignable. C. H. Little Co. v. Cadwell Tran-
sit Co. (1917, Mich.) 163 N. W. 952.
The assignment in this case involved the substitution of a new party
both in respect of the right to have sand and gravel transported by the
defendant and in respect of the duty to pay the price. The power of the
possessor of a contract right to effect such a substitution has long since
been fully recognized by the common law, by equity, and by statute. See
Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action (1916) 29
HARv. L. Rxv. 86. It has been thought, however, that an assignment is
invalid if it involves the substitution of a new party to perform a duty of
the assignor as well as to enforce his right. Arkansas V. S. Co. v. Belden
Mining Co. (888) 127 U. S. 379; Boston Ice Co. v. Potter (877) 123
Mass. 28. This depends on .whether or not the duty is one requiring per-
formance by the assignor in person, a question to be determined in the
same way as are other questions involving the doctrines of conditions
precedent. The tendency is now clearly in the direction of holding that
performance in person is not a condition precedent British Waggon Co.
v. Lea (i88o) 5 Q. B. D. 149; Northwestern L. Co. v. Byers (i9o3) 113
Mich. 534, 95 N. W. 529; Rochester Lantern Co. v. Stiles P. Co. (1892)
135 N. Y. 2o9; cf. the earlier case of Robson v. Drummond (1831, K. B.)
2 B. & Ad. 3o3. The fact that financial credit has been given to the
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assignor does not make the duty to pay the price a purely personal duty;
for the assignment does not affect the assignor's liability in case of non-
payment, and the assignment deprives the other party of no part of his
security. The English courts seem to have carried this to the extreme
of holding the assignment good, even though the duty of making payment
in the future has been turned over to the assignee and the assignor has
disabled himself from performing (as where the assignor is a corporation
and has been dissolved). Tolhurst's Case [1po3] A. C. 414. The principal
case goes to no such extreme and is easily sustainable.
C. I.
CRImINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD UNITED STATEs-FRAuDS IN
CONGRESSIONAL ELzcTIoNs.-The defendants demurred to indictments
under section 37 of the federal Criminal Code (Comp. St. I913, sec. io,20i)
which makes it an offense to "conspire . . . . to defraud the United
States in any manner or for any purpose." The indictments were based
on alleged conspiracies to bribe voters or cause illegal voting at congres-
sional elections. Held, that the conspiracies described were not within the
statute. United States v. Gradwell (1916) 37 Sup. Ct. 407.
The question has several times arisen under this statute whether the word
"defraud" should be interpreted in an exact technical sense as meaning to
deprive, by fraudulent means, of money or property, or whether it should be
extended to cover any deceit or imposition practiced on the government or
its agents in connection with the government service. Some decisions and
dicta in early cases tend to support the narrower construction. United
States v. Thompson (1886, C. C. D. Oreg.) 29 Fed. 86; United States v.
Milner (i888, C. C. N. D. Ala.) 36 Fed. 89o. Cf. Cross v. North Carolina
(i889) 132 U S. 131, 138-139, 10 Sup. Ct. 47, 49. And the general rule is
of course well recognized that penal statutes should be strictly construed.
Baldwin v. Franks (1887) 120 U. S. 678, 691, 7 Sup. Ct. 656, 662; France v.
United States (1897) 164 U. S. 676, 682, 17 Sup. Ct. 219, 222. Nevertheless
the later cases have rejected any limitation to property frauds and have
held that the statute is broad enough to cover "any conspiracy for the pur-
pose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any
department of government." Haas v. Henkel (IgIo) 216 U. S. 462, 479;
30 Sup. Ct. 249, 254 (conspiracy to obtain advance information of govern-
ment cotton reports). See also Curley v. United States (i9o4, C. C. A.
Ist) 13o Fed. i (conspiracy to impersonate another in civil service exami-
nation) ; United States v. Stone (i9o5, D. C. D. N. J.) 135 Fed. 392 (con-
spiracy to deceive government inspectors of life preservers). Whether the
principal case marks a tendency to return to stricter construction may well
be doubted. The opinion proceeds chiefly on the special ground that Con-
gress, having constitutional power to regulate congressional elections, and
having at one time exercised that power by a comprehensive system of
legislation, subsequently repealed this legislation and thus elected to leave
the matter to state regulation. Perhaps the case is most noteworthy as an
exception to the current'tendency to extend the scope of the federal laws
and leave less and less to the states.
G. L. Y_
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CRamnL LAw-FALSE P-RENSES-PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AS "VALU-
ABLE THING.--The defendant by false representations obtained medical
services from a physician. Section 1166 of the Mississippi Code of i9o6
made it an offense for any person, with intent to cheat or defraud another,
designedly to "obtain from any person any money, personal property, or
valuable thing." Held, that professional services were a valuable thing,
within the meaning of this section. State v. Ball (1917, Miss.) 75 So. 373.
This decision seems rather at variance with the "noscitur a sociW' rule
of construction. Professional services were held not to be "property"
under the Oklahoma false pretenses statute. Ex parte Wheeler (1912)
7 Okla. Cr. 562, r24 Pac. 764. (See Okla. Rev. L., 1gIo, sec. 2694.) But
see United States v. Ballard (i9o2, D. C. W. D. Mo.) i8 Fed. 757
(a month's lodging held a "valuable thing"). Cf. State v. Black (I89o)
75 Wis. 49o, 44 N. W. 635 (board and lodging not "property").
CRIMINAL LAw-TREAT TO KILL THE PREsMENT.-A statute, enacted
*by Congress February 14, 1917, provided that anyone who knowingly or
wilfully threatened the life of the President should upon conviction be
liable to $i,ooo fine or five years' imprisonment, or both. The accused
declared, "President Wilson ought to be killed. It is a wonder some one
has not done it already. If I had an opportunity, I would do it myself."
Held, that a demurrer, based on the ground that the language employed by
the accused did not amount to a threat, was properly overruled. United
States v. Stickrath (1917, S. D. Oh.) 242 Fed. 151.
The statute, rather than the application of it, is noteworthy as illustrating
the unexampled stringency of our present war legislation.
FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCES-SALES IN BULK ACT--OmIsSION OF
CREDITOR FROM VENDOR'S LIsT.-A "sales in bulk" statute provided that
the transfer of a stock of merchandise should be void against the trans-
feror's creditors "unless the transferee demands and receives from the
transferor a written list . . of the creditors of the transferor" certified
by him as complete, and unless the transferee "shall . . notify
every creditor whose name and address is stated in said list . ."' A
vendor omitted the name of one creditor from the list furnished under
this statute. The vendee had no knowledge of the omission and the
creditor was not notified. In all other respects the statute was complied
with. Held, that the vendee's title was good as against an attachment by
the omitted creditor. Glantz v. Gardiner (1917, R. I.) Ioo Adt. 913.
This case lines up another jurisdiction in favor of the proposition that
the fraud or mistake of the vendor in omitting a creditor's name is
not attributed to the bona fide vendee, so as to invalidate the sale as to
him. See, in accord, Coach v. Gage (1914) 70 Oreg. 182, 138 Pac. 847;
International Silver Co. v. Hull (1913) I4O Ga. Io, 78 S. E. 6og. In the
principal case the court decided that as the statute made the validity of the
sale dependent on the action of the vendee, not that of the vendor, and as
it did not require of the vendee that he obtain a complete list, but merely a
list certified by the vendor as complete, the omission by the vendee could
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not invalidate the sale. There is a dictum apparently contra in a Massa-
chusetts case where the seller, through misunderstanding of the statute,
included only merchandise creditors in the list, but the facts are not fully
stated and it is not clear whether or not the purchaser knew of the omis-
sion. If he did, of course, mistake of law would not excuse him. See
Rabalsky v. Levenson (1915) 221 Mass. 289, io8 N. E. o5o. The objection
to the decision in the principal case, that it does not protect the creditor,
for whose benefit the statute was passed, is met by the observation of the
court that this defect, if any, is for the legislature to remedy; and with
regard to the possibility of collusion the court points out that the creditor
still has all his previous remedies, and may show fraud in fact, if it exists,
and so avoid the sale, even if the vendee has fulfilled all the statutory
requirements. The decision seems justified as a matter of construction,
but discloses a weakness in the statute, since the vendor is under no effec-
tive compulsion to furnish a complete list.
L. F.
MONOPOLIES-SHERMAN Acr-"RUL OF REAsoN"--In a suit for triple
damages under the Sherman Act it appeared that the defendants, owners
of steamship lines operating between New York and South African ports,
in pursuance of an effective combination to restrict competition, estab-
lished by concerted action, if not by formal agreement, uniform freight
rates, including a "primage charge" which was subsequently refunded to
those shippers who shipped exclusively by the vessels of the combining
companies. Held, that the acts of the defendants amounted to a combina-
tion in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act Thomsen v.
Cayser (19,7) 37 Sup. Ct. 353.
There has been much popular misapprehension of the meaning of the
"rule of reason" announced by the Supreme Court in its construction of
the Sherman Act in Standard Oil Co. v. United States (1911) 22z U. S. I,
31 Sup. Ct. 502, and United States v. American Tobacco Co. (19ii) 221
U. S. io6, 31 Sup. Ct. 632. The Circuit Court of Appeals seems to have
shared this misapprehension when it reversed its former opinion in the prin-
cipal case and held that the combination wasnot shown to be in violation of
the statute because not in "unreasonable" restraint of trade. Union Castle
Mail S. S. Co. v. Thomsen (igii, C. C. A. 2d) igo Fed. 536. In
reversing this decision the Supreme Court reasserted what should
have been clear from its former. rulings, that the "rule of reason"
is to be applied, not to determine whether the motives of the defendants
were good or bad, or whether the power of the combination was used
benevolently or oppressively, or whether the results were in the Court's
opinion beneficial or injurious, but whether the underlying policy of the
statute,-to preserve competitive conditions,--was in fact violated. Under
some of the decisions before the Standard Oil Co. case, there was at least
ground for the inference that the combination of two out of fifty com-
peting concerns must necessarily be held unlawful, merely because it
theoretically destroyed the actual or potential competition between the two.
See Northern Securities Co. v. United States (i9o4) 193 U. S. I97, 331;
24 Sup. Ct. 436, 454; United States v. American Tobacco Co. (x9o8, C. C.
S. D. N. Y.) 164 Fed. 700, 70i-7o2. This conclusion no longer follows,
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if the "rule of reason" shows that the general condition of competition
in the trade is not substantially impaired. But if, in a given case, the
purpose or result of the combination appears to be to establish, in any
substantial sense, non-competitive conditions in the trade as a whole, the
policy of the law is violated, and no room is left for the court to apply
its own theories of policy, economics or morals. Standard Sanitary Mfg.
Co. v. United States (1912) 226 U. S. 2o, 49; 33 Sup. Ct. 9, i5; Cf.
International Harvester Co. v. Missouri (1914) 234 U. S. 199, 209; 34
Sup. Ct. 859, 862. Judged by this test the combination in the principal case
was clearly illegal. H.W.D.
SALEs-SERviNG OF GAME AS "SALiE' wITHiN GAmE LAw.-Two guests
at the defendant's hotel were served native partridge. The Ne~w York
Conservation Law provides that the dead bodies of birds native to the
state, and protected by law shall not be "sold, offered for sale, or possessed
for sale for food purposes within this state, . . ." Held, that the serving
of partridges as part of the guests' table d'h6te meal constituted a sale
in violation of the statute. People v. Clair (i917, N. Y.) I6 N. E. 868.
Both at common law and under the Sales Act, general property as dis-
tinguished from special property must pass in order to effect a sale.
Jenkyns v. Brown (1849) 14 Q. B. 496. Uniform Sales Act, See. i, §76.
But a guest at a hotel or restaurant does not get general property, i. e.,
all the incidents of ownership, in the food that he orders. He is privileged
to eat as much as he desires, but, having eaten, his control over the remain-
ing food is at an end. What he buys is not a specified quantity of food,
but service and the privilege of eating. The transaction of serving and
receiving pay for a meal has, therefore, been held not to constitute a sale
under the Sales Act. Merrill v. Hodson (1914) 88 Conn. 314, 9I At. 533;
Beale, Innkeepers §i69. On the other hand it has been held in cases
relating to statutes regulating the sale of liquor, impure milk, and oleo-
margarine that serving and receiving pay therefor does constitute a sale.
State v. Lotti (9oo) 72 Vt 115, 47 Atl. 392; Commonwealth v. Warren
(1894) i6o Mass. 533, 36 N. E. 308; Commonwealth v. Miller (i8go) 131
Pa. St 1i8, 18 Atl. 938. Since a technical interpretation of the term "sale"
in the case of game laws and similar prohibitory statutes would open the
way to evasion of the law, it is submitted that the more liberal construc-
tion adopted in the principal cast, anid in the great majority of similar
cases, is both reasonable and desirable.
C. S. B.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE AND TRANSFER TAXEs-ExEMPTION OF INSTI-
TUTION S REcENG "STATE An)'--The Connecticut Inheritance Tax statute
exempted "all property passing to or in trust for the benefit of any cor-
poration or institution located in this state which receives state aid."
(Pub. Acts of 1915, ch. 332, sec. 3.) The will of Justus S. Hotchkiss, a
Connecticut testator, left bequests to five institutions, including Yale Uni-
versity, all of which enjoyed under general or special laws more or less
complete exemption from ordinary taxation. Held, that such tax exemp-
tions constituted "state aid" within the meaning of the inheritance tax
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law, and the institutions receiving them were also exempt from the inheri-
tance tax. Corbin v. Baldzuin (1917, Conn.) 1oi At. 834.
Several instances of the use of the term "state aid" in various senses
in Connecticut statutes and decisions are referred to in the opinion. The
decision seems justified from the standpoint of statutory construction and
is in line with the previous policy of the state, both legislative and judicial,
in treating educational, religious and charitable institutions as in a sense
agencies of the state, established and encouraged for the public benefit.
TAXATioN-INHMTANCE AND TRANSFER TAxEs-SuRvIVORSHIP OF JOINT
TENANT.-A husband and wife owned jointly certain bonds, which they
delivered to a trust company as trustee to pay them the income in equal
shares and, if the agreement was in force at the death of either, to deliver
the bonds to the survivor. An amendment to the Transfer Tax Act, sub-
sequently passed, provided that where property was held jointly and pay-
able to the survivor, the survivor's right should be deemed a taxable
transfer. The husband died and a transfer tax .was assessed on his interest
in the bonds. Held, that the husband and wife were joint tenants and
not tenants by the entirety, and that his interest passing to his wife by
survivorship was taxable. In re McKelway's Estate (1917, N. Y.) 1I6
N. E. 348.
Apart from any question of constitutionality, inheritance and transfer
tax statutes are commonly construed as applying to such transfers and
devolutions only, as take place after the passage of the act imposing the
tax. Ross, Inheritance Taxation, sec. 36. Matter of Seaman (1895) 147
N. Y. 69, 41 N. E. 4O. And it was held in New York, in a case involving
a vested remainder not yet come into possession, that a statute attempting
to tax past transfers was unconstitutional. Matter of Pell (1902) i71
N. Y. 48, 63 N. E. 789. It has also been held, both in New York and
elsewhere, that contingent remainders created before the passage of the
tax law are not subject to tax though the contingency occurs subsequently.
Matter of Seaman, supra; Lacey v. State Treasurer (1911) 152 Iowa 477,
i32 N. W. 843. The principal case recognizes the rule against retroactive
operation, but argues that since the husband had power to defeat the
wife's right of survivorship by conveying his interest in his life-time, her
right was not vested until his death, and therefore at his death there was
a taxable transfer. This seems to be attaching undue weight to mere
inaction on the husband's part The wife's right in the principal case
would seem to be closely analogous to a remainder subject to be defeated
by the exercise of a power of appointment. The New York court has
expressly held that in such a case, while the exercise of the power would
be a taxable transfer, its non-exercise is not, and when the instrument
creating the power was prior to the statute, property passing in default
of appoinment cannot constitutionally be taxed. Matter of Langdon
(1897) 153 N. Y. 6, 46 N. E. 1034; Matter of Lansing (I9o5) 182 N. Y.
238, 247, 74 N. E. 882. In Massachusetts, however, a statute expressly
imposing such taxation has been upheld. Minot v. Treasurer (1911)
2o7 Mass. 588, 93 N. E. 973. The decision in the principal case thus finds
support in a case from another jurisdiction but is difficult to reconcile
with the previous New York decisions.
S. J. T.
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TAXATION-INHERTANCE AND TRANSFER TAXES-TRUSTEE'S COmmiS-
SIONS-APPROXIMATING EXPENSES OF ADMINISTRATIO.-A New Jersey
testator left the residue of his estate to his executors to hold as trustees
during the life of his wife, with remainders after her death. By the New
Jersey statutes, commissions of trustees are to be fixed by the courts
with reference to the "actual pains, trouble and risk" involved. Under
the Transfer of Property Tax Act of I9o9 (N. J. Comp. St 1910, p. 5301)
a tax was assessed on the residue without allowance for trustees' com-
missions, and the executors and trustees appealed. Held, that trustees'
commissions should be deducted in determining the net taxable value of
the residue passing to the beneficiaries, but that the comptroller's office
could not lawfully estimate in advance the amount of such commissions,
and must await the final allowance of the commissions by the proper
court. In re Christie's Estate (1917, N. J. Prerog. Ct.) IOI Ad. 64.
On the first point the court follows the New York decisions, on the
ground that the New Jersey Transfer of Property Tax Act was copied
from the New York act, from which it would be presumed that the legis-
lature intended to adopt the established construction in New York. The
New Jersey act applies to all stocks in New Jersey corporations held by
foreign decedents, and its administration is therefore of practical interest
to lawyers everywhere. The practice of the comptroller's office has been
to approximate and allow in the assessment the estimated expenses of
administration, without waiting for the estate to be finally settled. This
practice is disapproved by the court as "not warranted in law." It is to
be hoped that the decision on this point may be qualified or overruled or
the act amended to permit a continuance of the former practice, at least
in the case of foreign decedents. Otherwise the settlement in other states
of estates containing New Jersey corporation securities will be subjected
to great practical inconvenience and delay.
WILLS-OLOGRAPHIC WiM-UsE OF TYPEWRrrER.-The California Civil
Code, sec. 1277, required that an olographic will should be entirely "written,
dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself." A testator wrote
his will on the typewriter himself and signed it with his own hand. Held,
that in view of the reason for dispensing with witnesses to wills, namely
the protection against forgery furnished by identification of handwriting,
the word "written" in section 1277 should not be construed to include
typewriting, and that the will-was not entitled to probate as an olographic
will. In re Dreyfus' Estate (1917, Cal.) 165 Pac. 941.
The California statutes, like those of other states, require every will,
except a nuncupative will, to be "in writing." Cal. Civil Code, see. 1276.
Yet it is hardly to be doubted that typewritten wills, when fully attested
by witnesses, are constantly admitted to probate in California, as elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the reasoning of the court would seem to justify giving a
narrower meaning to the .word "written" in section 1277, though the only
case found on the same point is contra. In re Aird (1905) 28 Quebec
Super. Ct 235.
WVORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INJURY ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOY-
MENT--"HoRSEPLAY."-An employee sustained fatal injuries when another
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employee, as an act of sport, turned an air-compressor upon him. The
employer had known of the employees' habit of using the air-compressor
in sport, but had made no objection. The employee was working when
injured. Held, that the injury arose out of the employment within the
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In re Loper (i917, Ind.)
II6 N. E. 324.
It is generally held that the employer is exempt from liability for com-
pensation where the injury to the employee is caused by the wilfully tor-
tious act of either fellow employees or outsiders. Armitage v. Lancashire
& Y. R. R. Co. [19o2] 2 K. B. 178; Union Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Davis
(197, Ind.) 115 N. E. 676. Such injuries are said not to arise "out of the
employment." On similar principles compensation is generally denied
where the injury is the result of "horseplay." Wilson v. Laing (i9o9)
46 Sc. L. Rep. 843; Fishering v. Pillsbury (1916) 172 Cal. 69o. The princi-
pal case appears to be the first to recognize an exception where the habit
of horseplay is knowingly allowed by the master to continue-thus, in the
court's view, making the habit an element of the conditions under which
the employee is required to work. The decision seems sound, and an
analogy to support it may be found in such cases as Rowland v. Wright
[I909] i K. B. 963 (the "stable-cat case"), and Nisbet v. Rayne, etc. [igio]
2 K. B. 689. By failing to control his recklessly playful employees the
master subjects their fellow employees to a special hazard. A further
analogy is found in the common-law doctrine that the master is not only
under a duty to a servant to make proper rules for the use of safe methods
of work by fellow servants, but may also be liable if, having made such
rules, he permits their habitual violation. See Ohio & Miss. R. R. Co. v.
Collarn (i88i) 73 Ind. 261, 273; cf. Hogle v. Franklin Mfg. Co. (igio)
199 N. Y. 388, 92 N. E. 794.
F. C. H.
WoRxMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-INuRY "ARISING ouT op" EMPLOY-
mENT-PERIL ATTACHED TO WORKMAN'S PARTIcuLAR LOCATIoA -The fall-
ing of a wall on the adjoining premises of a neighbor carried down the
roof of the defendant's shed, in which the plaintiff was at work as a
herring packer, and injured the plaintiff. Held, that the injury was caused
by an "accident arising out of the employment." Thorn v. Sinclair [1917]
A. C. 127, ii6 L. T. 6og.
The compensation acts of many of the states are identical with the
English Act in limiting compensation to employees injured by accident
"arising out of" and "in the course of" the employment. Drawing a
distinction between the two conditions of liability indicated by the above-
quoted phrases, it has generally been held that "arising out of" includes
only risks incidental to the nature or character of the employment. Craske
v. Wigan (C. A.) [Igog] 2 K. B. 635; Hoenig v. Industrial Com. (I9,5)
159 Wis. 646, 15o N. W. 996. The accident need not be one that could have
been foreseen or expected. Larke v. Hancock Life Ins. Co. (I915) go Conn.
303, 97 AtI. 320. Nor need it be one peculiar to the employment, if the
employment accentuates a common hazard. Andrew v. Failsworth Ind. Soc.
(C. A.) [1904] 2 K. B. 32; State v. District Court (1915) 129 Minn. 5o2, 153
N. W. iIg. But the weight of judicial opinion has been opposed to the
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proposition that an injury is shown to be compensable merely by showing
that the presence of the person injured in the place where the accident
befell him was due to his employment. Klazwinski v. L. & M. S. Ry. Co.
(1915) 185 Mich. 643, 152 N. W. 213. It would seem that the principal
case marks a departure in the character of causation required to satisfy
the Act. The court refuses to go beyond the "proxima causa" i. e., the
falling of the roof, and declares that the remote cause which brings down
the roof-whether it be a neighbor's wall or a bolt of lightning-is im-
material. Such a view seems to render indistinguishable the two condi-
tions of liability imposed by the Act. It makes the employer an insurer
against accidents whether or not they are related to the nature of the
employment Cf. Trim School Bd. v. Kelly [1914] A. C. 667. One Amer-
ican case has been found in accord. Kimbol v. Industrial Acc. Corn.
(i916) 173 Cal. 351, 16o Pac. i5o. It is submitted, however, that the
dissenting opinion in that case contains the more cogent reasoning.
H. S.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Acr-REcovERY FOR DisEAsE CONTRACTED IN
THE COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT-The plaintiff, after working for twenty-
five years rolling cigars, was disabled by "neurosis" resulting from his
working posture, which caused a certain amount of pressure on the bra-
chial plexus. Held, that this was not a personal injury within the meaning
of the statute. In re Maggelet (1917, Mass.) II6 N. E. 972.
Under Workmen's Compensation Acts limiting recovery to "personal
injury by accident," unless, as in England, special provision to the con-
trary is made, no recovery can be had for diseases not resulting from a
definite injury constituting the "accident" Adams v. Acme White Lead
Works (914) 182 Mich. 157, 148 N. W. 485. In several states, however,
the act omits the qualifying words, "by accident" Yet the majority of
the courts do not put a broader interpretation on such statutes than on
those of the former class. Industrial Commission v. Brown (I915) 92
Oh. St 304, II N. E. 744. Miller v. American Steel & Wire Co. (i916)
go Conn. 349, 97 Atl. 345. Massachusetts, however, had already construed
its statute very liberally in permitting recovery for disease. In re H-rle
(914) 217 Mass. 223, IO4 N. E. 336 (optic neuritis); In re Johnson
(1914) 217 Mass. 388, io4 N. E. 735 (lead poisoning). The test, as
explained in the principal case, seems to be whether the diseased con-
dition results from the cumulative effect of what might be regarded as
a succession of physical injuries, though each "injury" in itself may be
too slight to be perceptible; with the further requirement that these
"injuries" must be the result of some exposure, strain, or other cause
"peculiar to the employment" The final test is, therefore, one of causa-
tion, and the plaintiff failed in the principal case because it did not appear
that his posture was a necessary incident of his employment The case
is interesting chiefly for its further exposition of the exceptional Massa-
chusetts doctrine.
H. S.
